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How the Energy and Water Development
Appropriations Act of 1993 Has.
Impacted the Constitutional Dynamics of
Federal Wetlands Delineation and
Regulation
JAMES J. S. JOHNSON* AND WILLIAM LEE LOGAN, II**
What is a wetland? How do you recognize a wetland when you
see one? What do you look for - ducks, reeds, rushes, mire? "Can
the rush [a hydrophytic plant] grow up without mire [hydric soil
essential for wetlands]? Can the flag [reed] grow without water?"'
* Adjunct Professor, LeTourneau University; Attorney at Law; Member, Texas
State Bar College; Water Quality Monitor certified by the Texas Natural Resource
Conservation Commission; Member, Society of wetland Scientists; Project Chair, Rock
Dove Environmental Studies & Stewardship Society; Member, Texas Bar Association's
Environmental & Natural Resources Law Section.
.. Judicial Law Clerk for the Honorable Judge James P. Churchill, Senior District
Judge (for the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan); Attorney at
Law; Member of the State Bar of Texas; Adjunct Professor, Cambridge Graduate School
[Springdale]; Regulatory Studies Chair, Rock Dove Environmental Studies & Stewardship
Society.
' Job 8:11 (with modernized wetland-friendly translation added to the Holy Bible,
1611 King James Version) asks about wetlands. Rush is a word still associated with a
family of wetiand vegetation. For example, the soft rush, Juncus effusus is a wetland
plant which thrives in the marshes and swamps throughout the northern United States.
WILUAM A. NIERING, WETLANDS, NATIONAL AUDUBON SOCIETY NATURE GUIDE 476,
plate 324 (1985). Flag is achu, meaning reed. Reeds are a classic example of a
hydrophytic wetland plant family. Accord, see NIERING, WETLANDS plates 219, 222, 229
(including yellow flag, sweetflag, anf blue flag as wetland plants). Mire is a translation
of bitstsah, which is translated fen elsewhere (in Job 40:21, alluding to a wetland popu-
lated by reeds, another wetland hydrophyte). Both mire and fen refer to ground saturated
or inundated with water, causing a wet land conducive for wetland vegetation. Today, in
America, the federal government rules over the fens:
Unfortunately for Mr. Jacobs, the federal government [i.e., the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers] considered his small [residential] plot of land in the
suburbs a calcareous fen. For those unfamiliar with bureaucratic jargon, a
fen is an area not quite wet enough to be a marsh but still wet enough to
qualify as a wetland. Calcareous only means that it sits on top of limes-
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Furthermore, of what use are wetlands? Wouldn't we be better off
without swamps and their resident vermin?
Not so long ago, Americans believed their marshes, swamps,
and bogs were wastelands. These wetlands couldn't be farmed,
and they harbored mosquitoes, cottonmouths, alligators, and other
disagreeable creatures, to say nothing of malaria. Clearly, the best
thing to do was to drain them, clear them, plow them, and control
them.
With the help of congressional bills like the Swamp Land
Act of 1849, which virtually gave away vast tracts of submerged
acreage to anyone who would reclaim them, Americans began to
destroy their wetlands at a pace which has accelerated through the
20th century.2
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) have answered these questions
with a set of regulatory criteria. Forget looking for ducks - look
for reeds, rushes, and mire. Wetlands are federally defined and rec-
ognized as ecosystems which cannot exist apart from certain vegeta-
tion growing under certain soil-water conditions. The federal gov-
ernment now regulates wetlands such as swamps, marshes, bogs,
fens, seasonally wet arroyos, and even prairie potholes.3 But just
what is a wetland?
4
A reliable source of specific criteria for recognizing a wetland,
as defined for federal regulatory purposes, would be valuable. In
1987 the Corps developed a technical manual (1987 Wetlands Man-
ual) for identifying wetlands.5 Later, in 1989, an interagency manu-
al (1989 Wetlands Manual) was developed. This 1989 Federal
tone, typical of much of Wisconsin.
Jonathan Tolamn, Property Rights and Wrongs, Wall St. J., Jan. 16, 1995, at A10.
Thus, this paper addresses an old topic with new problems.
2 WILLIAM A. NIERING, WETLANDS OF NORTH AMERICA 15 (1991).
The authors acknowledge aid provided by Dr. Donald L. Totusek (Adjunct
Professor, LeToumeau University) regarding, inter alia, the current regulation of fens, a
type of wetland.
* Answering this question incorrectly can have serious consequences - two defen-
dants served 19 months in jail because of their unauthorized interference with a wetland
by building on their own property. Both defendants were sentenced to incarceration for
21 months, plus fines of $5,250.00 per convicted defendant. See U.S. v. Mills, 817 F.
Supp. 1546, 1548 (N.D. Fla. 1993), affd., 36 F.3d 1052 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing United
States v. Mills, 904 F.2d 713 (1 1th Cir. 1990)).
1 ENVIRONMENTAL LABORATORY (WATERWAYS EXPERIMENT STATION, VICKSBURG,
MISSISSIPPI), U.S. ARMY CORPS. OF ENGINEERS. WETLANDS RESEARCH PROGRAM TECH-
NICAL REPORT Y-87-1 (1987) [hereinafter the 1987 WETLANDS MANUAL].
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Manual for Identifying and Delineating Jurisdictional Wetlands
attempted to provide a comprehensive and consistent set of criteria
for wetlands identification.6
The 1989 Wetlands Manual has been used to recognize
wetlands according to three evidentiary factors - vegetation, hy-
drology, and soil (VHS). Determinations based on the 1989
Wetlands Manual's VHS formula have been challenged on constitu-
tional grounds. In upholding VHS-based wetland determinations,
federal courts have considered delegation of powers doctrine, ripe-
ness, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The Energy and
Water Development Appropriations Act of 1993 (the 1993 Act),7
which became effective October 2, 1992, made the 1987 Wetlands
Manual the only valid standard which the Army Corps of Engineers
may use to decide jurisdictional wetland issues. Also, the 1993 Act
moots several possible challenges regarding wetland adjudication -
but only as to new wetland cases, and not as to preexisting wetland
disputes.
This paper frst addresses the development of criteria to delin-
eate wetlands. Part II focuses on the old cases and describes the
forensic logic used by federal courts to uphold the limited constitu-
tional use of the 1989 Wetlands Manual. Finally, Part III discusses
how the partially codified Energy and Water Development Appro-
priations Act of 1993 mandates the use of the 1987 Wetlands Manu-
al and thereby avoids many of the constitutional challenges which
have complicated the use of the 1987 and 1989 Wetlands Manuals.
6 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, AND U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE SOIL
CONSERVATION SERVICE, FEDERAL INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE FOR WETLAND DELINEA-
TION, FEDERAL MANUAL FOR IDENTIFYING AND DEUNEATING JURISDICTIONAL WETLANDS
(1989) [hereinafter 1989 WETLANDS MANUAL]. The 1989 Wetlands Manual is an federal
interagency publication by the Federal Interagency Committee for Wetland Delineation.
The Manual represents a joint effort by the Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers (Department of Defense), the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service
(Department of the Interior), and the Soil Conservation Service (Department of Agricul-
ture).
7 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act of 1993, October 22, 1992,
Pub. L. No. 102-377, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat.) 1324-25, (not codified in U.S.C.).
Although at first glance the October 1992 date may appear to be in error, the statute at
issue is, in part, an appropriations act of 1993. The preamble to the Act states that
funds are being appropriated for future use; i.e., in the fiscal year ending September 30,
1993. Id.
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I. WETLAND DELINEATIONS: WHAT ARE THE DEFINITIONAL
CRITERIA?
In the field of jurisdictional wetlands three primary factors
identify and delineate a wetland: hydrophytic plants, hydric soils,
and a wetland-type hydrology. 8 This three parameter approach test9
can be abbreviated as a vegetation-hydrology-soils analysis, or VHS
test."° The VHS test is central to the 1989 Wetlands Manual which
has been used by both the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps)"
and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2 Recently,
the 1989 version of the VHS test has been challenged as the Corps'
unconstitutional regulatory activity. However, due to the enactment
of the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act of 1993,
a public law which is only partially codified in the U.S. Code,
3
the Corps may no longer use the 1989 Wetlands Manual for any
wetlands-related regulatory determinations. Thus wetlands cases
consist of the old cases (pre-1993 Act) which are separated by the
new (1993) statute/new standard from the new cases (post-1993
Act).
Wetlands (in the federal jurisdictional wetland sense) are defined as "those areas
that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration
sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of
vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions." Avoyelles Sportsmen's
League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 930-931 (%th Cir. 1983) (publishing, as an appen-
dix to the 5th Circuit's affirmance, the trial court's Final Wetlands Determination and
quoting 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c)).
9 Mulberry Hills Development Corp. v. United States, 772 F. Supp. 1553, 1555
(D. Md. 1991).
10 It should be noted that the Fifth Circuit stressed that the VHS analysis is not a
mere checklist, but is the factual basis for an expert opinion "based on the complex
interrelationships among the three [VHS] factors." See Avoyelles, 715 F.2d at 918, N. 35.
1 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (1993) (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' definition of wet-
lands).
2 40 C.F.R. §230.3(t) (1993) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's definition of
wetlands).
3 This could be a nightmare for a litigator! Congress changed the law by an
appropriations act which changed the substantive law on a regulated subject (in this case,
wetlands), but the codifiers chose not to codify the relevant portions of the new statute.
Thus, a litigator researching the U.S. Code (and its annotations), could easily miss the
dispositive statutory amendment - even though a Public Law exists which is the
authoritative standard on the regulatory subject!
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A. Development of the Wetlands Manuals of 1987 and 1989
The delegation of wetland-related programs to federal agencies,
by virtue of Congressional delegations of U.S. power to regulate
commerce, fulfills regulatory goals of various federal statutes. For
example, the EPA and the Corps have roles pursuant to the Clean
Water Act amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
Title 33 U.S.C. section 1344, including permit issuance and regula-
tion regarding wetlands. The Corps makes jurisdictional determina-
tions pursuant to the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, Title 33
U.S.C. section 403. The Corps receives assistance in reviewing
permits and receives environmental impact-related comments from
the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National Marine
Fisheries Service, pursuant to the Fish & Wildlife Coordination Act.
Finally, the Soil Conservation Service (SCS) has been involved in
wetland identification since 1956 and has recently increased its
involvement in wetland regulation due to the "Swampbuster"
provision of the Food Security Act of 1985.
In 1987 the Corps developed a technical manual, 1987
Wetlands Manual, for wetland identifications; 4 during 1987-88 the
EPA did likewise. 5 Prior to 1989 the SCS and the FWS had also
developed their own procedures for wetland identifications. 6 Thus
the federal agencies regulating wetlands had established non-identi-
cal standards and procedures for identifying and delineating
wetlands, with the potential for inconsistent determinations. 7 In a
welcome display of cooperation and common sense, the wetlands-
regulating federal agencies agreed to work jointly toward the pro-
duction and publication of interagency standards which would be
adopted and applied the participating wetland-regulating federal
agencies. 8 The result was the 1989 Wetlands Manual.
Some landowners and developers have opposed the 1989
Wetlands Manual, saying that it contains landowner-unfriendly
amendments to prior wetland regulation law (i.e., the 1987 Wetlands
Manual. These litigants say that the Corps used an invalid procedure
14 1987 WETLANDS MANUAL, supra note 5.
'5 1, 2 W. S. SIPPLE, WETLAND IDENTIFICATION AND DELINEATION MANUAL
(1987).
16 1989 WETLANDS MANUAL, supra note 6, at 1-2.
17 id.
's Id. at 2. The interagency manual was adopted by the EPA, the Corps, FWS,
and SCS on January 10, 1989.
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to arrive at the new standards. Therefore the new standards' ex-
panded definition of what is a federal wetland is an invalid expan-
sion of the prior law.' 9 These landowners and developers have ar-
gued that just because a new standard makes better sense than the
old standard or is more efficient or cheaper for the government's
use does not mean that the new standard should be substituted for
the old law. Rather, for a new standard to be valid it must be enact-
ed or issued using the correct procedural process.2° Of course, the
gist of this challenge presumes that the 1989 standards for defining
wetlands were, in reality, different and more expansive than that of
the 1987 Wetlands Manual, a point not conceded by the Corps or
the EPA.2'
The 1989 standards were not part of legislation passed by
Congress. Rather, the 1989 wetlands identification standards were
"passed" by the four U.S. regulatory agencies noted above which
regulate wetlands.22 Perhaps, as a practical matter, the four U.S.
regulatory agencies originally intended to use the 1989 standards as
the law now governing wetland delineation (i.e., the four agencies
would use the 1989 Wetlands Manual internally and to determine
the rights and responsibilities of the private sector). It is unlikely
that the four U.S. agencies expected that their joint effort would
ever result in controversy because the content of the 1989 Wetlands
Manual is primarily technical in nature and because the Manual was
drafted expressly to provide a uniform approach, using vegetation,
soils, and hydrology to replace the four non-identical approaches to
defining wetlands. This move, though deemed insignificant by
many, provoked intense response in some.23
'9 See Mulberry Hills, 772 F. Supp. at 1556. "Plaintiff contends that if the 1987
Manual, which preceded the 1989 Manual, were applied, the delineation would be dif-
ferent, and the wetlands area on its property would be . . . 14 acres, instead of the
21 .." Id.
20 id. at 1556-57.
21 id.
22 1989 WETLANDS MANUAL, supra note 6, at 1-3.
2 "This case presents the disturbing implications of the expansive jurisdiction
which has been assumed by the United States Army Corps of Engineers under the Clean
Water Act. In a reversal of terms that is worthy of Alice in Wonderland, the regulatory
hydra which emerged from the Clean Water Act mandates in this case that a landowner
who places clean fill dirt on a plot of subdivided dry land may be imprisoned for the
statutory felony offense of 'discharging pollutants into the navigable waters of the United
States."' Mills, 817 F. Supp. at 1548. Cf. also United States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391




Because it appeared that the 1989 standards significantly ex-
panded the federal definition of what was a jurisdictional wetland, it
soon became a very important issue as to whether the new standards
were valid.24 The validity of the new 1989 standards regarding the
technical identification and delineation of federal wetlands depended
upon whether the issuance of those new standards was issued via a
valid quasi-legislative process of administrative agency rule-making.
In order for the new standards to be universally applicable and
authoritatively binding on the public, they must have been promul-
gated through the proper process.25 Litigants challenging the
propriety of the 1989 definitions argued that any change in stan-
dards used by the Corps or the EPA for defining wetlands could be
adopted only by the amendment procedure defined in the enabling
statute by which Congress delegated quasi-legislative powers or by
the rule-making process defined in the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), the statute that governs rule-making by administrative
regulatory governmental bodies in the event that there is no other
more specific procedural statute.26
The Congress had not then provided a specialized enabling
statute.27 Accordingly, the procedures of the Administrative Proce-
dures Act controlled.28 Challenging the use of the 1989 Wetlands
Manual appeared to be a sure win for landowners since the 1989
Wetlands Manual itself states that it resulted from a negotiated
committee meeting between four U.S. agencies, as opposed to
originating from any notice and comment procedure. 29 This docu-
24 "Dolgos [a VHS wetland delineator] apparently instructed Schwarm . . . that this
delineation must follow the standards set forth in the Federal Manual for Identifying and
Delineating Jurisdictional Wetlands published in 1989. . . . Plaintiff contends that the
1989 Manual is not simply an interpretive tool, as the government maintains, but that it
substantially changed the rules for defining wetlands without notice and other procedures
required for rulemaking by the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 551
et seq." Mulberry Hills, 772 F. Supp. at 1556.
" Id. at 1562.
2 id.
27 "Since the Clean Water Act does not set forth the standards for reviewing the
EPA's or the Corps' decisions, we look to the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5
U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. (1976), for guidance. . . . [T]he APA provides that a court shall
set aside agency findings, conclusions, and actions that are 'arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,' or that fail to meet
statutory, procedural or constitutional requirements. ... Avoyelles Sportsmen's League,
Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 904 (5th Cir. 1983). In October 1993 the legislature lar-
gely mooted this, however, as is shown in Part 111, infra.
28 Id.
29 The APA "notice and comment" process involves publication in the Federal
1994-951
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mentary admission 30 could have been outcome-determinative in the
litigation due to the APA's requirement for public notice and com-
ment prior to a federal regulatory agency's quasi-legislative rule-
making. 3' However, the agencies's actions were protected by the
interpretive rule exception."
Under this exception the APA authorizes a regulatory agency to
issue its own internal policy-oriented interpretive rule, whereby a
federal agency 33 adopts a uniform approach to interpreting its own
enabling statute and/or its own regulations. The exception is allowed
because such interpretive rules may be necessary and convenient for
an agency to execute its statutory mission.34 Since an interpretive
rule is not considered the same as public rule-making, it need not
follow the same notice and comment process to be valid.35 If the
Corps or the EPA used the 1989 Wetlands Manual only as an
interpretive rule the agency need not have used the APA's notice
and comment rule-making process to legitimize its interpretive use
of the 1989 Wetlands Manual.36
An interpretive practice is not quasi-legislative in the sense that
it is not recognized as an absolute standard by which the public
must act. However, an interpretive rule can function like a promul-
gated regulation in that it will likely become a statistically dominant
standard by which the agency usually acts.37 Therefore, although
an interpretive rule about how the Corps defines wetlands for its
own administrative purposes is not the same as the law on how
wetlands must be defined for the private sector, the interpretive rule
Register, etc.
30 i.e., the implicit admission that at an interagency committee produced the 1989
Wetlands Manual apart from the public "notice and comment" process.
31 This presumes that there is no other Congressional statute which provides a
different (non-APA) method of quasi-legislative rule-making for a given regulatory agen-
cy, a point not seriously debated in wetland litigation.
32 Mulberry Hills, 772 F. Supp. at 1557 (explaining the Administrative Procedures
Act's interpretive rule exception, codified at 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A)).
55 This general principle applies to federal regulatory agencies but not necessarily
to state regulatory agencies. See, Mary Reagan, Contesting Agency Action Based on
Informal Agency Policies, 2 TEx. ADMIN. LJ. 28, 74-85 (1993) (contrasting the legality
of internal policy-making within federal agencies under the federal Administrative Proce-
dures Act (APA) with the illegality of the same conduct by a state agency, under Texas'
statutory APA-counterpart, the Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act).
34 Mulberry Hills, 772 F. Supp. at 1557 (citing the APA).
35 id.
6 Id.
37 See generally, Avoyelles, 715 F.2d at 907-914 (discussing a challenge to the
Corps wetland definitions based on APA issues).
[VOL. 10:2
1994-95] FEDERAL WETLANDS DELINEATION
is the standard interpretation which the Corps (and EPA) could have
administratively used and applied regarding the law of wetlands.3"
In practice, what is the difference? Aren't the Corps' and the
EPA's own interpretations about wetland law effectively the same
as wetland law? The significance of the difference is that a quasi-
legislated standard, if it was properly issued after notice and com-
ment, would be the legal standard which determines what formula
must be used to delineate a wetland's boundaries, and thus what
evidence can be admitted as being relevant in an administrative evi-
dentiary hearing. 39 However, if the 1989 standards are only al-
lowed to be used interpretively, they cannot be used to disallow
proof which could otherwise be proffered and admitted as probative
evidence, assuming such proffered proof would be relevant and
admissible under 1987 standards.'" The importance of this distinc-
tion is illustrated by the controversies in Avoyelles Sportsmen's4
and Mulberry Hills42 where this issue was argued.
38 id.
39 id.
0 See Mulberry Hills, 772 F. Supp. at 1556-59.
4' Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983). A
1983 case, Avoyelles predates the Wetlands Manuals discussed in this article. However,
the court's approach is instructive. In this case the private defendants, owners of property
in the Bayou Natchitoches basin area of Louisiana, had sought to clear the forest from
the property and begin agricultural production. Id. at 901. The plaintiffs brought a
citizens' suit against the private defendants and the Corps and EPA. Id. The plaintiffs
maintained that the property was a wetland, "that the private defendants could not
engage in their landclearing activities without obtaining a permit from the EPA or the
Corps, and that the federal defendants had failed to exercise their 'mandatory du-
ty . I..' ld  at 902. "After examining the vegetation, soil conditions, and hydrology of
the tract, the EPA concluded that approximately eighty percent of the land was a
wetland. Id. at 903. The trial court then found that "over ninety percent of the [land]
was a wetland. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the agency's
decision should have been reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard and that
the trial court could not substitute its own wetlands determination for the EPA's. Id. at
907. Furthermore, the court held that "the EPA's wetlands methodology was not void for
failure to comply with the [Administrative Procedure Act] section 553 notice and com-
ment requirements because the methodology was an interpretative application. Id. at
910.
42 772 F. Supp. 1553.
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II. PROLOGUE: OLD CASES - CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO
WETLAND DELINEATION
A. Factual Background of Mulberry Hills
Mulberry Hills Development Corp. v. United States43 is a
noteworthy example of a federal case in which a private developer
challenged the constitutionality of the Corps' use of the 1989
Wetlands Manual to make wetland determinations. In Mulberry
Hills, the main parties were the Mulberry Hills Development Cor-
poration (a subdivision developer) and the United States, especially
in relation to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The Mulberry
Hills Development Corporation had received zoning authority to
develop 62 acres of land" for construction of 161 single family
homes. However, early in the stages of land development, a Corps
examiner found indicators of jurisdictional wetlands: cattails (an
obligate hydrophytic plant) and standing water (an example of wet-
lands hydrology). Moreover, soil sampling determined that the site
included "Pocomoke and Fallsington Series" soil, a hydric soil.45
The Corps, analyzing the empirical data by the delineation formulas
provided in the 1989 Wetlands Manual, concluded that about one-
third of the 62-acre tract was a wetland.46 The Corps promptly is-
sued a cease-and-desist letter stating:
A recent field investigation disclosed that fill material has been
placed on wooded nontidal wetlands .... Records in this [Corps]
office indicate that neither a Department of the Army permit nor a
letter of permission authorizing this work was issued by this of-
fice. The placement of fill material in Waters of the United States
of an adjacent wetlands without prior approval of plans by the
[Army] Department constitutes a violation of Section 404 of the
Clean Water Act. No further work is to be performed at this or
any other location in a waterway or on wetlands without com-
pliance with the laws. ... '
In response to the cease-and-desist letter and prior to litigation
the developer initially agreed to investigate the Corps' position to
'4 772 F. Supp. at 1556 (identifying the 1989 Wetlands Manual as the authority
for delineating jurisdictional wetlands).
" These 62 acres of land were purchased in 1988 for $600,000.00. Id. at 1555.
4 id.
4 Id. at 1556.
4' Id. at 1555-56.
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see if the wetland issue could be resolved. Specifically, the develop-
er agreed to retain an environmental consultant in order to respond
to the Corps' cease-and-desist letter. The developer's environmental
consultant did an on-site inspection to see if any of the land was a
federally defined wetland, and, if so, to delineate what part of the
land was such a wetland.48 The Corps demanded that the
developer's consultant use the three parameter (VHS) approach as
defined within the 1989 Wetlands Manual. However, the developer
wanted to use the criteria in the 1987 Wetlands Manual. He argued
that the 1987 standards would lead to less of the site, perhaps none,
being classified a wetland than if the criteria from the 1989
Wetlands Manual were used. "In particular, [Mulberry Hills Devel-
opment Corporation] argue[d] that the 1989 Manual relaxed the
definition of wetlands so that only two of the three [VHS] parame-
ters established by the regulation are necessary to characterize lands
as wetlands if the property has been disturbed by human agency. ' 49
In fact, the developer would later argue in court that the 1989 Wet-
lands Manual was so broad that, if applied literally, "perhaps 50
percent of the Eastern Shore of Maryland, including farmlands,
could be defined as wetlands."5 °
The developer disagreed with the Corps' demand to use the
1989 Wetlands Manual, claimed that the 1987 Wetlands Manual
was the only proper standard, and refused to submit to the Corps'
permit process. In effect, the developer challenged the Corps' legal,
scientific, and evidentiary process as invalid, and thus challenged
the foundation for the Corps' authority to issue the cease-and-desist
letter ruling.5 The developer then sued the Unites States, seeking a
declaratory judgment that the Corps' cease-and-desist letter ruling
was invalid and that the Corps' existing regulatory process regarding
wetlands determination was unconstitutional. 2
B. Legal Framework for the Mulberry Hills Decision
When the federal trial court ruled upon the developer's legal
challenges, the court needed to address several questions. Does
48 Mulberry Hills, 772 F. Supp. at 1556.
49 Id. But see Id. at 1558 (noting that the Corps officially used the 1989 Wetlands
Manual only as an interpretive tool).
'0 Id. at 1556.
i' Id. at 1558.
32 Id. at 1556, 1561-62.
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Congress have the authority to define and regulate wetlands? If so,
can the regulatory authority be delegated to an agency such as the
Corps? If the authority can be delegated, what criteria may be used
by the agency to delineate wetlands? These questions have been
answered recently by several other federal courts53 so the jurispru-
dential answers provided in Mulberry Hills don't stand alone. In
fact, the cases show a trend of forensic logic similar to that used in
Mulberry Hills and stand as informative precedents to those who are
concerned with wetland determinations.54
C. The Forensic Logic of Mulberry Hills, Mills, and Similar Cases
Mulberry Hills and similar cases provide a ten-point syllogism
of forensic logic which is useful in analyzing wetland-related consti-
tutional challenges: (1) Congress has constitutional power to define
and regulate interstate commerce; (2) U.S. waters are part of the
interstate commerce; (3) wetlands are included in such waters; (4)
thus, Congress may define and regulate wetlands; (5) Congress may
delegate its power to define and regulate wetlands; (6) Congress has
done so; (7) Congress' delegation allows regulations promulgated by
53 E.g., Slagle v. U.S., 809 F. Supp. 704, 709 n.6 (D. Minn. 1992); Golden Gate
Audubon Society v. Army Corps of Engineers, 700 F. Supp. 1549, 1555-1556 (N.D.
Calif. 1988); Avoyelles, 715 F.2d at 903, 910-13, 931.
, Sometimes, however, this issue is not reached in court because other factors
must be addressed first. Such was the case in Mulberry Hills where the ripeness doctrine
prevented the federal district court from reaching the issue.
In particular, Plaintiff argues that the 1989 Manual relaxed the definition
of wetlands so that only two out of the three [VHS] parameters established
by the regulation are necessary to characterize lands as wetlands if the
property has been disturbed by human agency. . . . In fact, for a time
Mulberry refused access to its land to the Corps for making a delineation
while at the same time refusing to conduct its own wetlands delineation,
as the Corps requested, under either the 1989 Manual or [the] pre-existing
[1987] regulations. . . . Here, however, there is no "regulation" that has
been promulgated pursuant to the APA, which, of course, is precisely the
basis for Mulberry Hills' challenge. In response, the Corps has denied that
the 1989 Manual would be used in delineating Plaintiffs property. This is
all a matter of conjecture until such delineation actually takes place. In-
deed, until such a delineation takes place using the 1989 Manual, it could
be argued that review of the legality of the [1989] Manual by this Court
would constitute an improper advisory opinion. . . . Until the use of the
1989 Manual is challenged on the administrative level, there can be no
final agency action ["ripe" for review on appeal] in this case.
Mulberry Hills, 772 F.Supp. at 1556, 1558-59. Accordingly, it is clear that courts will
require a final agency ruling before they will consider whether any wetlands delineation
manual was or was not used improperly.
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agencies such as the Corps. and the EPA to be used to define wet-
lands; (8) the process of jurisdictional delineation of a specific wet-
land must be consistent with the APA; (9) some federal uses of
specific tools such as the 1989 Wetlands Manual have been held
constitutionally valid; and (10) a protesting party must exhaust
administrative remedies before challenging the wetlands determina-
tion in court. The 1989 Wetlands Manual's VHS approach has been
useful for wetland determinations if APA compliance was
documented. A recent appellate ruling by the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals, Mills v. United States,55 accords with the forensic logic
of the Mulberry Hills syllogism.
This syllogism is especially useful as a guide for analyzing
future cases involving wetlands determinations where the 1989
Wetlands Manual was used in part of the process of defining
wetlands, particularly those wetland determinations which antedate
the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act of 1993.
1. Congress has constitutional power to define and regulate inter-
state commerce.
This bedrock point is derived from Article I, Section 8, of the
United States Constitution which provides that:
Congress shall have Power to ... regulate Commerce with for-
eign Nations, and among the several States .... [a]nd [t]o make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof.
" Mills v. United States, 36 F.3d 1052 (11th Cir. 1994), affirming United States v.
Mills, 817 F. Supp. 1546 (N.D. Fla. 1993) (holding that Congress provided sufficiently
precise standards for defining the "waters of the United States" so that the Army Corps
of Engineers permissibly included "wetlands" as part of that jurisdictional definition, and
thus the Corps could permissibly regulate such jurisdictional wetlands, even to the point
of prosecuting wetland "polluters" as felons imprisoned for 21 months with one year of
supervised release). In Mills, a portion of the property purchased by the appellants had
been designated a wetland by the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers. Mills, 36 F.3d at
1053. The prior owner had placed some fill material on the property. Id. at 1054. The
Corps notified the prior owner that be would need a permit to place fill material on
land designated a wetland, Id. The appellants purchased the property and continued to
place fill on the property "despite receiving two additional cease and desist letters." Id.
The appellants were convicted of violating the Clean Water Act and the Rivers and
Harbors Act Id.
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This constitutional provision, the Commerce Clause, is sometimes
cited in wetland cases where the extent and/or use of Congress'
regulatory power over interstate commerce is used as the jurisdic-
tional springboard for reaching wetlands.56
2. U.S. waters are part of the interstate commerce.
In Mills, a Florida federal district court noted that the phrase
"waters of the United States" was to be interpreted to stretch as far
as the Constitution's Commerce Clause would permit. During Oc-
tober of 1994 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this
position.57 Other federal courts have agreed on this point.5
3. Wetlands are included in U.S. waters because wetlands are
inextricably intertwined with the waters of the United States.
Just because Congress may regulate the "waters of the United
States" does not guarantee that Congress may regulate wetlands.
However, since some wetlands are adjacent to "U.S. waters" and
since such wetlands share their contents with waters that touch and
blend with "waters of the United States" such wetlands are suffi-
ciently "inextricably intertwined" with U.S. waters, so that such
wetlands are legislatively included with the U.S. waters which
Congress may regulate.59
E.g., Mills, 817 F. Supp. at 1553 (noting that Congress uses the Commerce
Clause to regulate the U.S. waters, and that wetlands thus get regulated due to the
relationship of wetlands to U.S. waters).
57 See generally Mills, 36 F.3d 1052.
"' U.S. v. Mills, 817 F. Supp. at 1553 (citing appellate cases from the 11th Cir-
cuit, 7th Circuit, 9th Circuit, and 6th Circuit Courts of Appeals). See, accord, Slagle,
809 F. Supp. at 709; Avoyelles, 715 F.2d at 915.
' Mills., 817 F. Supp at 1553 (citing U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S.
at 121, 139 (1985)). Both the EPA and the Corps define "waters of the United States"
to mean:
(I) All waters which are currently used, or were used in the past, or
may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all
waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide;
(2) All interstate waters including interstate wetlands;
(3) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (includ-
ing intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie
potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation,
or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce
including any such waters:
(i) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign
travelers for recreational or other purposes; or
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This relationship between U.S. waters and their adjacent
wetlands has been scrutinized with the result that the term, adjacent
wetland, means, in hydrologic effect, that the water of the wetland
ultimately drains into a tributary of a tributary of a navigable river
or seashore of the United States.'
4. Congress may define and regulate wetlands.
Based on points #1, #2, and #3, supra, Congress is within its
constitutional power to define and regulate wetlands if the wetlands
are hydrologically connected to a navigable water or territorial sea
of the United States. Because most wetlands will drain into some
tributary whose waters ultimately flow into some navigable river or
territorial water (ocean, gulf, etc.), the hydrological connection is
established and the wetlands are deemed adjacent wetlands.6'
5. Congress may delegate its power to define and regulate wetlands
so long as Congress provides a recognizable standard for measuring
the valid breadth of delegated authority.
It is one thing for Congress, a body politick comprised of
popularly elected officials, to define and regulate wetlands; it is
quite another thing for Congress to delegate its constitutional power
to a governmental body like the EPA or the Corps. Various statutes
(ii) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and
sold in interstate or foreign commerce; or
(iii) Which are used or could be used for industrial
purpose by industries in interstate commerce;
(4) All impoundments of waters identified in paragraphs (a)(l)
through (6) of this section.
Waste treatment systems, including treatment ponds or lagoons
designed to meet the requirements of CWA [Clean Water Act]
(other than cooling ponds as defined in 40 CFR 123.1 1(m) which
also meet the criteria of this definition) are not waters of the
United States.
Id. at 1551, N. 5 (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (1986), Corps' regulatory definition,
which mirrors 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s) (1980), EPA's definition, both cited in Mills, 817 F.
Supp. at 1551, note 5).
60 Mills, 817 F. Supp. at 1550-53; Slagle, 809 F. Supp. at 708-09, esp. at 709
(noting that 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(5) includes tributaries which allow an inland body of
water to be hydrologically connected to a U.S. navigable water body or territorial sea,
and thus fit the jurisdictional definition of U.S. waters).
61 Mills, 817 F.Supp. at 1550-53; accord, Niering, WETLANDS, NATIONAL AUDUBON
SOCIETY NATURE GUIDE, supra note I at 19-35; Niering, WETLANDS OF NORTH
AMERICA, supra note 2, at 15-25.
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have been challenged as improper delegations of federal constitu-
tional authority - though few such challenges have persuaded the
U.S. Supreme Court to void the delegations.62
In connection with the Clean Water Act amendments to the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, the U.S. Supreme Court has
recognized a broad power in Congress to delegate water quality
control issues to regulatory agencies (such as the EPA and the
Corps) so long as the delegation is done via an enabling statute
which contains some kind of discernible criteria that allows a re-
viewing court to decide whether the agency was acting within the
proper scope of its congressional delegation.63
6. Congress has delegated the power to define and regulate
wetlands to the EPA and to the Corps.
The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the defining and regu-
lating of adjacent wetlands provides a sufficient legal basis for
Congress' delegation of jurisdictional wetland determinations to the
Corps and the EPA.64 Thus, the Corps' and the EPA's administra-
tive regulations of wetlands (by permit issuances and denials), as
well as the fundamental power to declare what is and what is not a
jurisdictional wetland, is solidly approved by the U.S. Supreme
Court.65 This power to define the parameters of the very regula-
tions which the Corps and the EPA legislate, prosecute, and adjudi-
cate, appears to be such a broad delegation that it knocked the
constitutional breath out of the Mills trial court.66
62 E.g., see Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458
U.S. 50 (1982) (ruling that Congress' revised version of federal bankruptcy court system
involved an unconstitutional delegation of powers to non-tenured Article I bankruptcy
judges). See generally, Mills, 817 F.Supp. at 1552. "The principle that the Constitution
prohibits Congress from delegating its legislative authority is essentially nugatory, for
little is required of Congress when it want to obtain the assistance of its coordinate
branches [such as EPA and DOE, parts of the Executive branch]." Id. "So long as
Congress 'lay[s] down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person of
body authorized to act is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden
delegation of legislative power."' Touby v. U.S., Ill S.Ct. 1752, 1759 (1991) (quoting
J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. U.S., 276 U.S. 394, 409, 48 S.Ct. 348, 352 (1928)).
63 In the case of wetlands, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the delegation
Congress made to the EPA and to the Corps is a proper delegation in light of the dis-
cernible statutory language and policies of the Clean Water Act as viewed against the
legislative history of the Clean Water Act amendments. Mills, 817 F. Supp. at 1553






7. Congress' delegation of wetland regulation to the EPA and the
Corps allows the regulations promulgated by the Corps and EPA to
be used to define, identify, and delineate jurisdictional wetlands.
Which regulations may be used and how are the regulations to
be implemented in 1995? In answering these questions we must
distinguish between an old case involving a wetland-related deter-
mination made prior to October 2, 1992, and a new case involving a
wetland-related determination made after October 2, 1992, since a
federal statute enacted in 1993 provides different answers to these
time-frames.
In an old case situation an administrative evidentiary hearing
might typically involve the Corps, which is authorizing a limited
land-use permit (or refusing any disruptive filling in or dredging in
such a wetland) and a protesting landowner (or developer), who is
protesting the Corps' position. The landowner's opposition may
stem from the desire to have none of his or her land designated as a
jurisdictional wetland or, what is more likely, because the landowner
Thus, the broad purpose of the [Clean Water] Act was to protect
water quality and aquatic ecosystems. It was this broad purpose which
guided the Army Corps [of Engineers] when it defined "waters of the
United States" to include wetlands adjacent to what are commonly thought
of as waters - bays, lakes, rivers, etc ...
. '* 'Of course, to a layman, a "wetland" is land that is most
often, if not mostly, under standing water or so saturated that it is, in fact,
wet. That type of wetland is a logical extension of the adjacent body of
water. Despite its blanket approval of the Corps' regulatory authority over
"wetlands," it is doubtful that the Supreme Court realized that the Corps'
definition extends to land that appears to be dry, but which may have
some saturated-soil vegetation, as is the situation here, or that it would
define the elements of a felony offense.
A jurisprudence which allows Congress to impliedly delegate its
criminal lawmaking authority to a regulatory agency such as the Army
Corps [of Engineers] - so long as Congress provides an "intelligible
principle" to guide that agency - is enough to make any judge pause and
question what has happened. Deferent and minimal judicial review of
Congress' transfer of its criminal lawmaking function to other bodies, in
other [governmental] branches, calls into question the vitality of the tripar-
tite system established by our [U.S.] Constitution. It also calls into ques-
tion the nexus that must exist between the law so applied and simple logic
and common sense. Yet that seems to be the state of the law. Since this
court must apply the law as it exists, and cannot change it, there is
nothing further that can be done at this level.
817 F. Supp. at 1554-55.
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doesn't want as much67 of his or her land delineated as jurisdic-
tional wetland.
If the protesting landowner wanted to introduce into evidence
some expert testimony by a qualified wetland delineator using the
1987 Wetlands Manual's technical standards, and if the Corps
hearing officer refused to allow that evidence in because it wasn't
based on the exact formula of the 1989 Wetlands Manual, the land-
owner could appeal this evidentiary ruling (and all administrative
rulings tainted thereby) on the basis that 1989 standards were used
as the Corps' quasi-legislative standard, and not just as an interpre-
tive rule for the Corps' internal purposes.68
Thus, evidentiary proceedings conducted before the Corps or
the EPA should not treat the exact formula of VHS technicalities as
set forth in the 1989 Wetlands Manual as some kind of quasi-legis-
lative standard because doing so is admitting that the 1989 standards
were used and applied as the legal authority on how a wetland must
be identified and delineated. If this occurs, the regulatory agency
has invited an appeal based on the defective promulgation of the
1989 standards as the law of wetland regulations.69
What is a more prudent approach for the Corps or the EPA
when processing a disputed wetland matter? The agency should
conduct its fact-findings and other official proceedings in a way that
considers any technical evidence fitting all three of the VHS catego-
ries as defined in the 1987 Wetlands Manual. This consideration
should include the technical insights and concepts set forth in the
1989 Wetlands Manual, since the 1987 VHS categories are inextri-
cably intertwined with the 1989 evidence categories.7°
Whatever technical evidence is gained by interpretive use of
the 1989 Wetlands Manual should be admissible as relevant evi-
dence, i.e., having probative value, for establishing the wetland
identifications which are made using the 1987 Wetlands Manual
67 E.g., see Id. at 1556.
6' Mulberry Hills, 772 F. Supp. 1553 (where the Corps avoided this error).
6' The appellate review is dominated by deference to the agency's scientific exper-
tise, yet qualified by a search of the evidence in the whole administrative record, to
ensure that the administrative agency's ruling followed a consideration of all the relevant
factors and can be viewed as a rational conclusion thereupon. See, accord, Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-416 (1971) and Save Our Wet-
lands v. Sands, 711 F.2d 634, 635-642 (5th Cir. 1983), followed in Avoyelles
Sportsmen's League, 715 F.2d at 907.
70 Mulberry Hills, 772 F. Supp. 1553 (noting that the Corps maintained that the
1989 Wetlands Manual was merely an interpretive tool).
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criteria, because the evidence is routinely used by wetlands experts.
To the contrary, the fact that Congress, by virtue of what it said in
the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act of 1993, has
indicated its dissatisfaction with the 1989 Wetlands Manual could be
persuasive evidence that the 1989 Wetlands Manual should not have
been used by the Corps even as an interpretive rule.
8. Applying the jurisdictional wetland definition to a specific prop-
erty must be done in accord with the APA.
Compliance with the APA includes development of an eviden-
tiary record to fulfill due process requirements and to provide a
court with a record which is sufficient to permit meaningful review.
The forum of first instance, i.e., the agency acting as a chancel-
lor/trial court, must provide the higher court with a written record of
the contested issues and evidence so that the reviewing court can
determine whether the quasi-adjudicating agency has committed
error so plain that the agency's ruling must be reversed.7
Judicial review of the administrative agency's final decision
will be in federal district court pursuant to the Administrative Pro-
cedures Act (APA).72 The district court must be able to discern
from the written record what the legal issues are, whether the liti-
gants had proper notice in order to satisfy Constitutional Due Pro-
cess7 3 requirements, and whether the evidentiary record supports
the agency's factual findings and legal conclusions.
The reviewing court gives deference to the regulatory agency's
expertise and its determinations, and looks only to see if they are
supported by the evidence in the administrative trial record. The
agency's determinations will be overturned only if they appear
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law., 74 The reviewing "court is not empowered to
substitute its judgment for that of the agency."75 The fact that the
record may also possess evidence to support a different set of con-
" Mulberry Hills, 772 F. Supp. at 1558-62.
72 Slagle, 809 F. Supp. at 711.
73 The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the APA does not list formal
details on how the initial evidentiary hearing must be processed, Overton Park, 401 U.S.
at 415-16, although fundamental fairness traditions, as recognized in 5th Amendment Due
Process cases, are a constitutional minimum.
74 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
75 Avoyelles, 715 F.2d at 904 (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)).
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clusions than those reached by the regulatory body is irrelevant.
Likewise, the fact that the reviewing court might have decided the
case differently is irrelevant. In effect, the reviewing court defers to
the agency's decision in a manner like a traditional trial judge
confronted with a j.n.o.v. motion challenging a jury verdict. As long
as the evidence can permissibly support the verdict, the verdict is to
be left as is.
7 6
9. Interpretive use of the 1989 Wetlands Manual is valid so long as
APA procedures are followed when the jurisdictional wetland defi-
nition is applied to a specific property.
The Corps and the EPA may make wetland identifications and
delineations using the 1989 Wetlands Manual as an interpretive
guide to discovering and describing technical evidence since such
evidence is relevant to the overall evidentiary goal of determining
what is and what is not a jurisdictional wetland. Of course, some
kind of evidentiary record should clarify that these constitutional
considerations were prudently observed.
The 1989 standards have some technical evidentiary value for
the initial evidentiary proceedings before the Corps or EPA hearing
officers due to standards' use by expert witnesses, so long as that
use is consistent with the federal wetland definition." The Federal
Rules of Evidence recognize the domain of expert witnesses.78
Because expert witnesses reasonably could use the 1989 Wetlands
Manual to gather relevant information about wetlands79 the use of
the 1989 standards should be relevant and admissible. Furthermore,
such use of the 1989 Manual should not be outcome-determinative
of whether a particular old case wetland identification was defective.
But, in any event, all wetland experts (especially wetland
delineators) should be careful to link their factual observations and
their expert opinions8 ° to the 1987 Wetlands Manual standards.8 '
76 FED. RULE Civ. P. 50.
" See supra note 8.
FED. R. EVID. 702-705.
79 This argument can be based on FED. R. EvID. 703, regarding facts or data "of
a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field [e.g., delineating wet-
lands] in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject .. "
go Again, it should be stressed that the VHS analysis is not a mere checklist, but
is the factual basis for an expert opinion on whether particular acreage is or is not a
"wetland" by the federal definition - "based on the complex interrelationships among
the three [VHS) factors." See Avoyelles, 715 F.2d at 918, note 35.
81 Cf. FED. R. EviD. 704-705 (on opinion testimony about ultimate issues and
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10. A protesting party must exhaust the administrative process for
making challenges to wetland determinations as a prerequisite to
filing a ripe protest suit in federal district court; moreover, the
federal district court litigation will most likely be a non-jury trial in
which the court defers to the agency's expertise.
Since the wetlands issues are to be tried first before the regula-
tory agency in question, i.e., the Corps or the EPA, a court chal-
lenge against agency action will be dismissed as not ripe for district
court adjudication until a final ruling has been made at the agency
level.82
Agencies don't utilize juries. Some never give this a second
thought; others may be troubled, thinking that jury trial rights are
constitutionally guaranteed for such cases.8 3  The U.S.
Constitution's Seventh Amendment does not guarantee a jury trial to
everyone who files a civil action in federal court. The Seventh
Amendment only guarantees the procedural right to a jury to those
litigants who could have litigated their controversy in a common
law court84 as of 1789, the year when jury trial rights were frozen
underlying grounds therefore).
82 Mulberry Hills, 772 F. Supp. 1553.
" But see U.S. CONST. Amend. VII.
It often appears that the greater concern over environmental regulations is not so
much the juristic integrity or soundness of the governmental regulatory program as it is
the economic impact. If environmental regulation negatively affects a person's assets the
person subject to the regulation is inclined to challenge the regulation as improper.
The concept of a trustee-like stewardship is not new to Anglo-American
culture, due to the Biblical principle that "the earth is the LORD's, and the
fullness thereof... " (Psalms 24:1). The seed-form of environmental law,
i.e., the concept that the government regulates specially protected natural
resources - is also not new to Anglo-American jurisprudence: England's
"forest law" . . . [dates from the Dark Ages] . . .
Environmental responsibility concepts, as well as environmental
regulation, are not wholly new to Anglo-American thought or law, as ...
[both are respectively demonstrated above, in the Holy Bible and in
England's forest laws].
What is "new", however, is the magnitude of money [$$$] involved
in environmental liabilities and in the insolvencies produced thereby...
[quoting from 1992 pleadings filed in the consolidated Insilco bankruptcy,
where "the claims filed by some 1200 environmental creditors exceed $9
billion"].
James Johnson & William Logan, Environmental Claims and the Bankruptcy Process:
Claims Advocacy for Private Environmental Torts - Balancing Environmental Restitution
Policy with the Debtor's Fresh Start, BANKRUFrCY BRIEFS, Spring 1993, at 8-9, notes I-
2 (citing Psalms 24:1). Accord, see also Francis Schaeffer, POLLUTION AND THE DEATH
OF MAN: THE CHRISTIAN VIEW OF ECOLOGY 47-93 (1970).
" "In suits at common law, . . . the right to trial by jury shall be pre-
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in time. The determinative question is how one's litigation rights
could have been litigated, historically speaking. 5 This may require
the use of analogy, since 1789 represents a time when English
courts were largely unconcerned with environmental concerns of
today, such as nuclear reactors, cormorant extinction, coastal marsh
wetlands, and the like.
86
Someone who challenged the British government's decision to
issue or not to issue a dredging permit in 1789 did not then have a
cognizable legal right to assert in an English common law court.
Accordingly, a similarly situated American, in 1995, has no consti-
tutional right to a jury trial to assert in challenging a permit ruling
today. 7 Likewise, no English landowner in 1789 could challenge
the Crown in a common law court regarding the forest laws which
regulated the use of England's woodlands. No jury trial was avail-
able for a declaratory judgment suit then so none is constitutionally
guaranteed now. In sum, unless and until the Congress legislates a
statutory right to a jury trial8 8 for wetland regulation-protesting
civil litigants, there will be an administrative bench trial for litigants
disputing jurisdictional wetland issues, followed by a deferential
review (of the quasi-adjudication's ruling) by a federal district court.
When the federal district court judicially reviews the quasi-ad-
judication results, which presupposes a final agency action, the
federal district court will be predisposed to show deference to any
agency ruling which is supported by evidence in the record. Al-
though the administrative agency may use the 1989 Wetlands Man-
ual as probative evidence of the VHS indicator categories, the "u-
served .. " U.S. CONsT. amendment VII. The U.S. Supreme Court has pointed out that
the Seventh Amendment is to be construed using a historical preservation test.
" See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 37 (1989) (stating that the
7th Amendment is to be construed using a historic preservation test); Langenkamp v.
Culp, 498 U.S. 42, 44 (1990) (using waiver theory to recognize loss of jury trial rights).
' This is not to say that our present century invented the concept of environmen-
tal stewardship. Environmental stewardship obligations are at least as old as Moses, as
Deuteronomy 22:6-7 shows. (Isn't that fitting? Note that Moses, when he was three
months old, floated among the reeds [obligate hydrophytes] on the littoral edge of an
Egyptian wetland!)
87 This is different from an individual who is sued by the federal government due
to wetland-related activities for civil penalties which are analogous to common law
damages; such a defendant can claim a jury trial right as to whether the land is a wet-
land. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, (1987).
" If Congress's actions in the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act




Itimate" questions answered by the expert witnesses, out of an abun-
dance of caution, will most likely be associated with the standards
of the 1987 Wetlands Manual.
III. NEW STATUTE/NEW STANDARD
A. The Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act of
1993
On October 2, 1992, the Energy and Water Development Ap-
propriations Act of 1993 became federal law. One of the provisions
of the Act involved the Corps' regulation of wetlands:
None of the funds in this Act shall be used to identify or delin-
eate any land as a "water of the United States" under the Federal
Manual for Identifying and Delineating Jurisdictional Wetlands
that was adopted in January 1989 or any subsequent manual
adopted without notice and public comment.
Furthermore, the Corps of Engineers will continue to use the
Corps of Engineers 1987 Manual, as it has since August 17, 1991,
until a final wetlands delineation manual is adopted. 9
The Corps now has explicit direction from Congress to use the
1987 Wetlands Manual as the standard for identifying and delineat-
ing jurisdictional wetlands until further contrary notice from Con-
gress. Thus, the delegation doctrine issues evaporate and become
moot as to all wetland determination issues that originate after Oc-
tober 2, 1992.
B. Epilogue: New Cases
Congress has explicitly directed the Corps, until further notice,
to use the 1987 Wetlands Manual in all wetlands-related matters,
thus establishing the 1987 Wetlands Manual as the statutory stan-
dard9° for defining federal jurisdictional wetlands. Due to the direc-
tion Congress has provided in the Energy and Water Development
Appropriations Act of 1993,91 for new wetland controversies aris-
89 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act of 1993, October 22, 1992,
Pub. L. No. 102-377, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat.) 1324-25, (not codified in U.S.C.).
o This is as opposed to any quasi-legislative standard, arising from a legislative
delegation, and promulgated by an administrative body after the APA's "notice and com-
ment" process is followed.
9' The authors express thanks to Presley B. Hatcher, a biologist with the U.S.
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ing after October 2, 1992, the dispositive issue is whether the Corps
or the EPA has properly used the 1987 Wetlands Manual, not
whether the 1987 or the 1989 manual is a valid standard for
regulatory purposes.
However, as the Mills litigation illustrates, wetland-related
litigation can be in the pipeline for years before final adjudication
and appeal exhaustion is completed.92 The Appropriations Act of
1993 is not to be applied retroactively. If Mills is representative of
what kind of cases may be in the adjudicatory or appellate pipelines,
it may be that Congress' mandate in the 1993 Act will not govem
some of the next eight or so years' worth of dockets involving
disputed wetland determinations. In sum, the above analysis of
wetland-related determination litigation issues, including constitu-
tional challenge issues, will continue to be relevant for several years
to come.93
Army Corps of Engineers (Fort Worth District), for helpful information he provided
regarding this uncodified statute.
9'2 The Mills' appeal before the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals was decided
October 27, 1994, many years after the focal events (in 1985) which gave rise to the
felony convictions, and even years after the first appellate cycle (in 1990). See Mills, 36
F.3d 1052, 1054 (1ith Cir. 1994).
" Also, if Congress were to directly or indirectly repeal the Energy and Water
Development Appropriations Act of 1993, the public and private sectors both "return to
square one" so that the 1987 and 1989 manuals remain without the APA "notice and
comment" processing needed for either manual to be an adequate quasi-legislative
regulatory standard.
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